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Abstract:
According to the Small Arms Survey, there are an estimated 875 million small arms
and light weapons (SALW) in circulation across the globe. All countries, as well as
numerous non-state armed groups, have access to these types of weapons. There are both
legal and illegal means of obtaining such weapons, and they can be used for a variety of
purposes 1. While SALW do have a range of legitimate uses, these are also the primary
instruments of violence used in most internal and inter-communal conflict.2 This study
aims to address negative impacts that access to these types of weapons has on the human
security and development of impoverished and underdeveloped regions. To do so, this
research shall focus on one region in particular.
Access to SALW has had a particularly destructive impact on Sudan and the new
nation of South Sudan. The proliferation of SALW, especially by non-state actors
(particularly armed groups and civilians) is an important factor in the escalating violence
of the Sudan region 3. In order to understand the harmful role that small weapons play in
Sudanese conflict, it is crucial to understand the history of this conflict and its sources.
Much of the armed conflict in this region occurs as a result of ethnic or political divisions
that simply grow beyond government control. This violence, worsened by the ease with
which portable SALW are obtained, creates a myriad of problems for the region.
Development stagnates, and in some cases ceases completely. Human security diminishes
for people living within the direct conflict zone, as well as beyond the country’s borders. It
Small Arms Survey, “ Weapons and Markets,”
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/index.php?id=122 (accessed November 10, 2013)
2 Peter Hazdra, Small Arms- Big Problem (Vienna: Schriftenreihe der
Landesverteidigumgsakademie, 2007), 15.
3 Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk,”
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/arms-and-ammunition-tracingdesk.html (accessed November 9, 2013)
1
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is important that adequate measures be taken to reduce the danger that SALW create in
Sudan and South Sudan. Many organizations believe that the best way to do this is through
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, also known as DDR. This paper provides
some alternatives to traditional DDR strategies.
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Preface:
I chose to study this topic after my experiences visiting northern Uganda in 2012. I
saw firsthand the impacts that poverty and corruption can have on the security sector of a
developing region. While there, I met the son of the late rebel leader John Garang. Hearing
his son’s story inspired me to learn more about the Sudanese Civil War and the current
status of Sudan and South Sudan. My interest in military history and development
prompted me to learn more about small arms and light weapons in these destitute regions.
This paper has given me the opportunity to explore all of my interests, and gain a better
understanding of the situation in Sudan, South Sudan, and many other post-war developing
countries.
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Introduction:

This study will focus on the destructive nature of small arms proliferation in postwar societies. In order to gain a realistic, effective understanding of their effects, it is
necessary to examine both how those arms get into the wrong hands after armed conflict
has ended, as well as the direct and indirect results of their presence. This investigation
shall review specifically the role of small arms and light weapons in Sudan and South
Sudan. A great deal of the existing research on this topic comes from the Small Arms
Survey. This independent research project serves to gather information on all facets of
small arms proliferation, and serves as a resource for governments, researchers and nonstate organizations alike. It provides case studies on specific countries that face a problem
with small arms proliferation. It does so not to criticize those governments, but to expose
the realities and identify the factors that drive these realities. From the desk of the Small
Arms Survey, one learns the definition of a “small arm and light weapon” and also the main
routes of transit for these products. This is important to understand the overarching
themes that can be found in the Sudan and South Sudan proliferation issue. A great deal of
information for this analysis comes from another desk of the Small Arms Survey, the
Human Security Baseline Assessment Project (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan. This
program deals specifically with small arms security and armed violence in Sudan and South
Sudan. The HSBA has published a number of working papers, such as “My Neighbor, My
Enemy: Intertribal Violence in Jonglei” and “Reaching for the Gun: Arms flows in South
Sudan.” The HSBA papers provide a more specific perspective on small arms, particularly in
regards to Sudan and South Sudanese populations. The current analysis seeks to integrate
the information available from the Small Arms Survey projects with details about the
impacts of small arms on human security and development in Sudan and South Sudan.
7

After describing the problems that come from the presence of small arms, this analysis will
introduce some potential ways that the traditional DDR process can be refined to best solve
the small arms problem in Sudan and South Sudan.

When exploring these articles, a number of themes emerged that influenced the direction
of my research. I have developed a number of research questions that this paper seeks to
answer. These are:
--What defines a small arm/ light weapon (SALW)?
-How do SALW get spread to developing/war-torn countries?
-How did weapons become so easily available in Sudan and South Sudan?
-What are some examples of their negative impacts on Sudan and South Sudan?
-How do we solve this problem?
-How should traditional DDR methods be shaped to fit Sudan and South Sudan?
In answering these questions, I hope to come up with some of the sources of the small arms
problem in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as some possible solutions.

Research Methodology
To understand this issue, I used a combination of primary and secondary sources. I
combined knowledge on the legislation dealing with small arms trade and armed conflict
with specific information on Sudanese and South Sudanese armed violence. The personal
interviews that I conducted served as a background for my research, and help steer the
direction of my study. The Small Arms Survey provided a great deal of resources and
working papers on the role of small arms and light weapons in general. The HSBA supplied
more specific information on Sudanese and South Sudanese issues. The HSBA collected a
number of reports on various aspects of regional instances of SALW use, as well as
8

information on the origins of these weapons. The nature of my research required a great
deal of information about Sudanese and South Sudanese-specific aspects of the arms trade,
so this site provided a great deal of my information regarding the origins of regional issues.
I combined this information with research about the impact of SALW availability on
development, and was able to make conclusions about SALW on the development of Sudan
and South Sudan. I then used all of this collected information to make judgments about how
to revise current DDR practices to be more productive and effective in the region.

In this way, I formulated my main research questions, as well as a general thesis. This
paper shall analyze how small arms and light weapons have become so regularly available
in Sudan and South Sudan, the ways these weapons further complicate regional issues, and
how it has damaged the development process. I then formulate several ways to revise the
arms reduction process to best fit the Sudanese and South Sudanese situations.

9

What is a SALW?
Before delving too deep into the issue of small arms proliferation, it is first
necessary to define the term “small arms and light weapons.” According to a 1997 UN panel
of government experts, SALW are above all defined by their portability. These small,
relatively lightweight weapons are easy to transport and distribute, making their
proliferation of particular concern. The term ‘small arms’ includes revolvers, self-loading
pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns. ‘Light
weapons’ refers to heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade
launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable
launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft
missile systems (MANPADS) and mortars of calibers less than 100mm4. The term SALW
also includes the ammunition for each of these types of arms and weapons; it is a crucial
part of the danger of SALW proliferation, and can therefore not be overlooked. As
mentioned in the preface, there exist almost a billion SALW in circulation around the world.

Where Do These Arms Come From? Where Do They Go?
SALW like those used in Sudan and South Sudan are produced by over 1000
manufacturers in almost 100 countries. They are created and transported by a variety of
legal and illegal means, and are in high demand by a number of actors. Their small size,
combined with the often-times illegal nature of their trade makes tracking and controlling
SALW quite difficult5. Due to the spread of technology and the ease with which licenses and
production rights may be obtained, it is significantly easier for countries to produce these

Small Arms Survey, “Definitions” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-andmarkets/definitions.html
5 Small Arms Survey, “Weapons and Markets”
4
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arms much more cheaply, quickly, and in higher numbers than ever before6. The top
manufacturers of SALW are not the most underdeveloped or corrupt governments, but the
top exporter countries such as China, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy7. India,
Pakistan and North Korea are major producers as well because of the large domestic
market they have for these types of products. There is also a growing trend of small-scale
craft production in underdeveloped countries. Some populations living in violent or
underdeveloped societies have realized the huge market for these dangerous products, and
developed independent means to create them on a small-scale8. These types of SALW are
often under limited or no government control, and are even harder to track9.
Once produced, it is simply a matter of getting these arms to the countries with the
highest demand. New and surplus arms are delivered to both state and non-state actors in
a variety of legal and illegal routes. According to a Small Arms Survey in 2012, the
international small arms trade is worth at least 2.5 billion US dollars. It is because of this
that the illegal transfer of such dangerous weapons is so difficult to curtail 10.
But something must be done. Current estimates indicate that SALW are responsible for 8590 percent of people killed and injured globally every year. Over 50 percent of the weapons
responsible for these deaths were held by non-state actors outside of governmental
control. 11 SALW trade occurs in the highest concentration in areas wracked with violence,
armed conflict, and organized crime. These weapons only intensify the severity of civil
Small Arms Survey, “Producers” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-andmarkets/producers.html
7 Small Arms Survey, “Industrial Production” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weaponsand-markets/producers/industrial-production.html
8 Small Arms Survey, “Illegal Trafikking” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-andmarkets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html
9 Small Arms Survey, “Producers” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-andmarkets/producers.html
10 Small Arms Survey, “Transfers” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-andmarkets/transfers.html
11 Hazdra, Small Arms- Big Problem, 8.
11
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wars and regional conflicts and add to the stockpiles of dangerous armed groups. They
contribute a lethal nature to conflicts that could have otherwise been solved peacefully.
SALW escalate violence, often making it much harder, if not impossible to resolve. We see
this pattern played out again and again across the globe. In order to understand all the
complicated problems that can arise from SALW proliferation, it is most useful to analyze
case studies that provide real-world examples. This research shall focus specifically on
SALW proliferation in Sudan and South Sudan.

SUDAN
For the purpose of this paper, I shall split the instances of armed conflict in Sudan and
South Sudan by country. The first section will focus on examples of violence in Sudan,
including the Second Sudanese Civil War, as well as conflict in the border states of Darfur
and South Kordofan. The second will concentrate on violence in South Sudan as a result of
animosity left over from war. It will also discuss tribal violence in the Upper Nile Region.
Each of these examples presents a brief description of an instance of armed conflict, and
the ways in which SALW have made it worse.

SECOND SUDANESE CIVIL WAR
Currently, there are approximately 2.7 million SALW in Sudan, and two-thirds of these are
circulating outside of government control. 12 Since its independence in 1956, Sudan (and
what is now South Sudan) has been engulfed in intense civil conflict. Internal war over
resources, power, religion, political representation and self-determination has prevented
any degree of lasting peace. This persistent discord deprived the people any type of real

12

Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk”
12

stability, growth, or development, and wreaked havoc on the country.13 This war also
resulted in the influx of a huge number of SALW to supply the militants on either side.
The Second Sudanese Civil War broke out in 1983 and lasted until 2005 initially
over the long-term political and economic marginalization felt by a number of minority
groups in Sudan14. Due to the sprawling and disorganized nature of the Second Sudanese
Civil War, it was extremely simple for smugglers and even ordinary citizens to gain
possession of arms left over after the war had ended15. Most war-torn areas lacked
effectual infrastructure, making it very difficult to secure weapons and ammunition
stockpiles according to international best practice standards16. The physical security of
SALW stockpiles was minimal, resulting in a great deal of misuse and transference of
weapons. The war involved a number of non-state groups who were subject to less
stringent standards for physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) practices, so
the theft and dispersal of weapons outside of governmental control was much less
complicated. During the war, members of the SPLA (the army of South Sudan) were allotted
one rifle and ammunition, but also frequently obtained more guns that they seized from the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Due to the scarcity of suitable ammunition, these guns were
rarely used once taken. Instead, they could be easily traded to the members of the
community for food or other goods that soldiers desired. The limited PSSM measures made
trades like this especially easy for non-state militia groups like the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Due to resource scarcity and consideration of
strategic factors, the SPLA placed a greater emphasis on the need for mobility and surprise

United Nations Mission in Sudan. “The Background to Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.” http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515
14 Small Arms Survey. “Ad Hoc Arsenals: PSSM Practices of Selected Non-State Actors.”
Armed Actors Issue Brief no. 2 (May 2013): 9.
15 Small Arms Survey. “Ad Hoc Arsenals,” 9.
16 ibid., 2
13
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rather than strong security in permanent storage facilities. As a result, many weapons were
kept in hidden places like tree canopies or rock formations that blended into the
surroundings17. There was little protection against unauthorized access, so it was no doubt
considerably easier to smuggle or steal weapons from these facilities than from
conventional military stockpiles. Oftentimes, soldiers would distribute guns to elders or
chiefs in small communities. Tribal affiliations created the desire to protect their
communities from raiding tribes or SAF forces, so extra guns were given out to chiefs or
civilians to aid in local defense18. It is not surprising therefore, that Sudan has a large
problem with SALW proliferation amongst not only non-state groups, but by civilians as
well.
The Second Sudanese Civil War was only mildly resolved in 2005 with the signing of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Unfortunately, all this agreement really did was to
temporarily diminish public government military action. It left the status of both states
vague, and did little to address the human rights abuses and starvation left over from the
war19. Under the agreement, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A accepted a number
of protocols. These included agreement on security arrangements, wealth-sharing, powersharing, resolution of conflict in Abyle, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states (sites of
tribal violence), and also provisions on the eventual self-governance and transitional
process for a new state of South Sudan20. However, the majority of these protocols have yet
to be truly implemented. There was no provision about what to do with arms stockpiles left
from the war. The agreement also did not involve a comprehensive cease-fire, so a
potential re-emergence of violence was extremely likely. The next few years saw the
ibid., 10
ibid., 9
19Human Security Baseline Assessment. “Sudan.”
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan.html
20 United Nations Mission in Sudan, “Background to Sudan’s Peace Agreement”
17
18
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reemergence of outbursts of conflict, especially by tribal and non-state armed groups.
There has yet to be an effective resolution.
The South Sudanese nation became independent on July 11, 2011, but this was not the end
of border violence21.

DARFUR
Currently, the Government of Sudan is facing two different conflicts within its borders. The
first being fought against a number of Darfur armed opposition groups; the second deals
with indigenous rebels in Kordofan. These states retain ties with South Sudan22.
Since the Second Sudanese Civil War, relations between the Government of Sudan and
Border States have become increasingly tense. Due to their location between Sudan and
South Sudan, they are subjected to a great deal of violence and local disruption. For years,
groups in the Darfur region of Sudan accused the Government of Sudan of marginalizing
Darfur’s non-Arab population. Fighting broke out in Darfur in 2003 between the
Government of Sudan Forces (SAF) in alliance with Jangaweed militia and other non-Arab
rebel groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in alliance with the
SPLM/A23. The non-Arab militants are primarily recruited from the Fur, Zaghawa, and
Masalit tribal groups. The attacks in these regions are ethnically related, making them
especially violent; the steady access to SALW makes these confrontations even more
deadly.

Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Sudan”
ibid.
23 Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Darfur”
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur.html
21
22
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An estimated 300,000 people have died and 2 million displaced since the Second
Civil War outbreak, and fighting continues to this day2425. Widespread atrocities such as the
rape and murder of civilians have become commonplace; violence is everywhere. Finding
peace in Darfur has since become one of the United Nations’ top priorities, and a number of
missions and organizations have been created and delegated to the cause26. However, the
brutality continues. The conflict hasn’t improved; it has only evolved, enabled by SALW.
The flow of SALW is in direct opposition to international sanctions and a UN arms embargo
placed on trade with Darfur intended to stop the supply. There exists ample evidence
proving that the arms supplied are not only of the same type as in the past, but new models.
This indicates that suppliers have renewed their contracts with Darfur rebel groups and
the SAF, willingly facilitating the continuation of the violence.
Some of these arms come from surrounding regions. Darfur is now a battleground
for proxy wars by neighboring countries. Chad, Libya and South Sudan were historically
affected by events in the Darfur region, and thus asserted their assistance to militant
groups across Sudan’s borders in attempts to create positive change for their local
situations. In general, arms are transported to Darfur through three main vectors: from
Libyan government stockpiles, from Chadian Armed Forces stockpiles, and from the SAF
domestic supply chain. Today, SAF has become the most prominent of these three27. There
also exists proof that the militias of South Sudan have provided support to JEM and other
non-Arab groups. Seized arms from SAF provide a constant supply to non-Arab militias28.
There is also evidence of a large number of Chinese manufactured weapons being used in
Human Baseline Security Assessment, “Sudan”
Nations Department of Public Information- Peace and Security Section. “United Nations
and Darfur: Fact Sheet.” (August 2007): 1.
26 ibid., 2,3
27 Human Security Baseline Assessment. “Business as Usual: Arms Flows to Darfur 200912.” Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no 20, (September 2012): 3.
28 Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms Flows to Darfur”, 4.
16
24
25

the conflict29. It is clear that the 2005 arms embargo to Darfur is being blatantly violated,
and with few repercussions
Despite the 2005 embargo’s issue with effectiveness, it has remained largely
unchanged. Its limited geographical scope allows some international manufacturers and
suppliers to give arms resources to the Government of Sudan legally, regardless of the
knowledge that these arms will more than likely be used in Darfur. A lack of concentration
on tracking and security by arms-suppliers has made it quite easy for these weapons to be
used to sustain the Sudanese Government’s continual violation of UN resolutions on
Darfur30.
It is clear how easy it is for these dangerous weapons to end up in the wrong
hands. Disorganized militias on either side have constant access to SALW and use them at
will. As a result, the region continues to be torn apart by all manner of violence. The
uncontrolled and sporadic nature of the Darfur conflict is particularly troubling. There
have been several attempts to generate peace talks between groups, but these have proved
largely unsuccessful. As of 2013, a few new complications have surfaced in the Darfur
conflict. In the Jebel Amir area in North Darfur, fighting has become fierce over control of
gold reserves, Sudan’s most valuable commodity. In South Darfur, tribal confrontation over
Acacia gum has led to more inter-communal violence. The fact that these relatively isolated
issues can become so violent and bloody is an indication of the dire nature of the situation.
Access to military resources and arms has only worsened existing tribal and resource
disputes. 31 Inter-tribal and ethnic violence is a historical trend but in previous years it was
much easier to solve conflict peacefully when such violent tools were not available. Now,
due to the ease with which guns can be obtained, it is extremely tempting to use SALW
ibid., 6.
ibid.,, 10.
31 ibid
29
30

17

instead of a more peaceful conflict resolution methods32.Similar research has been
conducted in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, proving the occurrence of the same
patterns in those regions33.

INTERTRIBAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KORDOFAN
In 2011, violence erupted in the Border States between the Sudanese national and
paramilitary forces and the northern branch of the SPLM in alliance with some armed
opposition groups. This conflict mobilized a huge number of civilians and militants in the
region and led to an even greater presence of SALW34. Even if a solution is found to the
North-South Sudan conflict, it will not be sufficient to end the violence in South Kordofan
(one such border state). The issue here is an internal Sudanese problem that impacts the
stability of Kordofan and the whole surrounding region. 35
South Kordofan consists mainly of a number of non-Arab tribes, living in an area
called the Nuba Mountains. Since Sudanese independence, the tribes there have been
subjected to a number of unjust policies by the Khartoum government. Sudanese laws
constantly favored Arab cultures, creating unjust policies like opening up their land for
farming investment. As a result, the inhabitants of the Nuba allied more closely with the
South Sudan rebel leader John Garang, and his acceptance of the multi-ethnic nature of
Sudan (and South Sudan)36. As a Nuba land expert put it “the encroachment of mechanized
rain-fed farming into the customary Nuba farming land bringing socio-economic
devastation was the single most important issue behind the extension of the civil war into
Formal interview, Ivor Fung. November 11, 2013.
Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms Flows to Darfur,” 1.
34 Claudio Gramizzi and Jerome Tubiana. “New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in
South Kordofan,” Small Arms Survey (2013): 8.
35 ibid.,, 10
36 Gramizzi and Tubiana, “New War, Old Enemies,” 11.
32
33
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the Nuba Mountains37” It is clear then, how customary and cultural elements served as the
basis for violence and socioeconomic problems to spread. After the end of the war in 2005,
little national attention was paid to this growing dilemma. This ethnically-based problem
turned deadly once SALW force was introduced. The severity of fighting was allowed to
fester, and the root causes were never addressed. Tensions rose until 2011, when a real
war began38.
The conflict ravaged the civilian population; over 400,000 people were directly
affected. At least 100,000 were moved into refugee camps to escape hunger and starvation
in war-torn areas. Many are too frightened to return to their farms, sharply decreasing the
amount of food available39. Random and unselective bombardment by the SAF in the Nuba
Mountains continues, to the point that the Nuba region remains near uninhabitable. The
presence of SALW makes the likelihood of violent confrontation infinitely more likely, and
makes the situation much worse.
The SAF forces have near unlimited access to weapons through means of legal and
illegal trade, despite embargoes and trade barriers. The rebels also have access, using
weapons seized from the SAF by the SPLA. In this way, the same people that supply one
side of the conflict also supply the other, indicating that arms-suppliers are to a large
degree responsible for the terrible devastation of this region40. Lately, the Sudanese
Government has favored military options over any type of concession to the SPLA, only
reinforcing the willingness of militants to support the violent culture of conflict in the Nuba
Mountains.

ibid., 13.
ibid., 18
39 ibid., 21
40 ibid.,19
37
38
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SOUTH SUDAN
Similar patterns of SALW use occur in South Sudan.
Though only a nation for a few years, South Sudan is also plagued by chronic
conflict. The location of much of the fighting in the Second Sudanese Civil War, it was
subjected to a great deal of upheaval and destruction. Toward the end of the war the issue
became not only between the SPLA and the Sudanese Government, but also between the
SPLA and various Khartoum-supported militias in the south. Despite numerous attempts
by the SPLA leadership to integrate these enemy troops and commanders with the SPLA,
they remained largely antagonistic. To this day, the SPLA still struggles to contain the
threat of violence from internal enemy militias, as well as some groups of external origins
(such as the Lords Resistance Army from Uganda). The constant threat is difficult to
control; the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is very weak and low on resources, and the
SPLA cannot be utilized to its full capacity because some parts of the SPLA (SPLA-North)
are still involved with rebellions in Kordofan and the Blue Nile States41. This security
vacuum left room for a number of armed groups to operate successfully with relatively
little interference. The presence of militias, self-defense units, cattle-raiding groups, armed
civilians and nomadic communities, (among a great deal of other groups) challenge the
safety and security of all those living in South Sudan42. A few of these groups include
insurgent leaders who have launched numerous rebellions against the South Sudan
government and army, destabilizing much of the Greater Upper Nile Region. There has also
been an explosion of inter-tribal violence, the worst the region has seen in years.

Human Security Baseline Assessment. “South Sudan.”
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan.html
42 Human Security Baseline Assessment. “South Sudan.”
41
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Each of these instances of violence was fueled by the steady supply of SALW. Since
South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the ban on material acquisitions to the state was
lifted, allowing the government to pursue a number of defense contracts with armssupplier states. Simultaneously, a great number of non-state groups (tribal, militia, etc.)
have begun acquiring illicit weapons at an increasing rate43. Where there is conflict, arms
will flow44. The demand for weapons in South Sudan is enormous, and outside suppliers
have had no problem meeting this demand45.
This consistent access to weapons has only worsened the already dire situation in
South Sudan. The country faces poverty, hunger, and starvation, and this added dimension
of violence only makes problems worse. The desperate situation has worsened tensions
over land, resources, political representation and ethnic rivalries. The proliferation of guns
in itself is not the problem; the problem occurs when increased levels of tension and
violence attract the weapons to be used. In a tense situation like that of South Sudan, it is all
too tempting to use the ever-present SALW as a method for managing disputes, instead of
more peaceful means46.

JONGLEI AND UPPER NILE STATES
The same trend is also demonstrated in the worsening of intertribal violence in Jonglei
state, South Sudan. The growing number of armed insurgencies has made the region more
volatile and dangerous. The conflicts that have resulted from these rebellions have led to
the death of thousands of South Sudanese civilians, and displaced many more. Whole

Human Security Baseline Assessment. “Reaching for the Gun: Arms Flows and Holdings
in South Sudan.” Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no 19, (April 2012): 1.
44 Formal interview, David Atwood. November 19, 2013.
45 Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Reaching for the Gun” 1.
46 Formal interview, Ivor Fung. November 11, 2013.
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communities have been forced to relocate. It is no surprise than, that many of the South
Sudanese have lost all faith in the ability of their government to protect their interests and
their lives. This encourages even more rebellion, as groups attempt to create real change in
the South Sudanese nation. 47
For the most part, these rebellions are led by individuals who have taken advantage
of local resentment toward the government and the South’s weak security sector. Many
groups and tribes feel excluded by the government, so it is relatively easy for those
opportunistic individuals to use community dissatisfaction to increase their own power.
The presence of guns makes it all too simple for these rebellions to turn violent very
quickly. Where there are guns, the temptation is always there to use them48.
Most of the worst instances of violence in the South are between the Lou Nuer,
Murle, and Dinka tribes in Jonglei State. The string of attacks between tribes have grown
more and more violent due to easy access to deadly weapons. These conflicts mainly stem
from the lack of real governmental services, increased competition over natural resources,
the deterioration of traditional structures of leadership in the tribe, and the changing
nature of cattle raiding.
Conflict becomes violent as a result (direct or indirect) of the increased access to
weapons. Rebel militias, as well as members of the SPLA have supplied a great deal of
weapons and ammunition to Jonglei communities. An increase in the frequency and
intensity of the attacks, along with a change in targeting tactics (due to new amounts of
SALW) have made violent outbursts much more deadly49. Cattle raiding has taken on a new
degree of seriousness. Once these raids were focused only on obtaining cattle from
fighting for spoils- jonglei state……?
interview, mr fung
49 Jonah Leff, Human Security Baseline Assessment. “My Neighbor, My Enemy: Inter-tribal
Violence in Jonglei” Sudan Issue Brief no. 21 (October 2012): 1.
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neighboring tribes; now they have taken on a more ethnically-driven nature.50 Because of
the increased available firepower, attackers now can raid whole villages, killing civilians of
all genders and ages. They target NGO facilities, schools, hospitals, and other spaces crucial
for the communities’ human development. This new era of violence worsens depending on
trends in food availability and social conditions, but never truly subsides51.
The sources of these weapons are easy to deduce. During the Second Civil War,
weapons circulated easily to the SAF-backed militias and SPLA-breakaway groups. But due
to some civilian disarmament programs, many of these weapons had been collected by
2012. However, these disarmament efforts were uncoordinated and insufficient, so
communities were able to easily re-arm. Armories and stockpiles were not well protected,
so looting stocks of the weapons that had been collected was not difficult. Weapons are
brought across borders by local militias or shipped in by local traders. They shuttle small
arms and ammunition from other states in the country and neighboring nations into town
centers; these weapons are available for trade or for cash and are quite difficult to trace.
After the civil war, the country saw a rapid influx of young men returning from
war52. They returned back to their village still carrying guns and without job prospects.
With little direction, they directed their attention at already existing tribal rivalries, and
used their weapons in conflicts that had previously been fought in more traditional and less
violent ways.53 The influx of militias brought even more weapons into Jonglei. Some armed
militias attempted to persuade youths to join with them and fight the SPLA in return for
weapons. Unfortunately for militia leaders, this strategy backfired, and many of the youths
used the weapons not to attack the SPLA, but in ethnic rivalries in their communities. The
ibid., 1.
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SPLA also was one of the main suppliers of weapons to the youth population. After
independence, they established a paramilitary force called the “SPLA Youth,” meant to
counter rebel militias. However, there exist a great deal of reports indicating that instead of
using the weapons for defense of South Sudan, the SPLA Youth traded arms and
ammunition for food and alcohol in local markets. This contributed to the proliferation of
untracked weapons by civilians54.
The increased role of firearms has also had negative impacts on traditional tribal
power relations. The influence of elders and tribal chiefs over the youth population has
been undermined by the power associated with owning and using firearms. The erosion of
traditional leadership destroys the practical conflict mitigation mechanism that was once
presided by the community elders55.
Overall, it is clear that arms are quite easy to obtain in Jonglei. Residual anger
and mounting frustration make the temptation to use SALW for the wrong reasons too
strong to ignore56. It has been difficult to find a solution to this evolving problem. The
seriousness of the issue remains largely ignored by the government and non-state
groups57. Even when national law enforcement exists, it is too weak to make any tangible
improvement in human security and safety58.

ibid., 4.
Jonah Leff, Human Security Baseline Assessment. “My Neighbor, My Enemy”5
56 interview mr fung
57 Paul Eavis, “SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Ways
Forward,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no. 1 (2002): 254.
58 Leff, “My Neighbor, My Enemy,” 7.
24
54
55

THE EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION ON HUMAN SECURITY
In each of the above cases, it is clear that while the SALW themselves do not create
the conflict, they worsen and prolong issues, increase lethality of confrontation, and make
reconciliation much more complicated59. SALW aggravate already existing structural
imbalances, creating insecurity and an inescapable cycle of poverty among already
vulnerable groups. Since Sudan and South Sudan are already vulnerable to certain risk
factors- such as the marginalization of certain ethnic and political groups, rampant
unemployment and social inequality- it is all the more likely that violence will emerge as a
result of the availability of SALW. 60
Due to low cost, widespread availability and portability, small arms are also the
types of weapons most commonly used in illicit and internal conflict such as gang violence,
crime, and civil war. Their long lifespan causes them to be continuously reused and
recycled from old conflicts, fueling new ones. In the absence of legitimate political authority
and an effective policing sector, the availability of such weapons leads to a widespread
culture of violence.

61.

This culture inhibits the healthy growth of development, and the

countries cannot flourish. The prevalence of violence has led to higher levels of urban
insecurity in North and South Sudan; the increased availability of deadly weapons leads to
a direct increase in violent crime and deadly assault. Instead of using traditional and more
peaceful means to solve conflict, disputes are settled with deadly force. 62

Eavis, “SALW in the Horn of Africa,” 251.
Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, co-published with UNDP. “Development Held
Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development,” (2002): 8.
61 ibid., 21.
62 Eavis, “SALW in the Horn of Africa,” 253.
59
60

25

Resource scarcity, political marginalization, and ethnic rivalries create tension
between communities, which is unleashed via lethal weapons63. An increasing number of
civilians (as opposed to combatants) are directly targeted and killed by small arms. Even
after war has ceased, the number of casualties per year has only marginally declined 64.
Violence does nothing but spur more violence and hatred, creating a cycle that cannot be
undone. While this large number of weapons still exists among militia and civilian
populations, it will be near impossible to solve any of the issues plaguing Sudan and South
Sudan.
Beyond simply racking up a high death toll, the availability of SALW creates a great
deal of socioeconomic and human security problems for the region as well. The overall
quality of life diminishes due to prevalence of criminal activity. As a result, this has serious
implications on labor productivity, the value of property investment, the cost of goods and
services, and the success of the tourist industry65. It places a huge economic burden on the
country; medical clinics and hospitals spend a great deal of time and resources on caring
for gunshot victims, when more could be spent on the prevention of disease and treatment
of disability In Sudan and South Sudan, rebel group insurgencies and tribal warfare have
contributed to the deterioration of social and health services. NGO and medical facilities are
often the targets for attack. This not only impacts the feeling of safety of medical and
peacekeeping officers, but also inhibits the ability of such organizations to operate. Without
such facilities, civilian access to healthcare and social services is extremely limited. Patients
have little or no access to health services, and the facilities that do exist are over-stretched.
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The public health sector has deteriorated, which restricts possibilities for health
interventions and contributes to the spread of infectious disease in the region66.

THE EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
All of these factors are directly linked to Sudan and South Sudan’s ability to develop
as nations. Human development stagnates when the infrastructure, health, and security
sectors are not working properly. Effects of SALW on human development come in the
form of direct and indirect impacts. Direct refers to the immediate deaths and injuries that
result from armed violence. Indirect impacts include criminality, displacement,
deterioration of public services, reduced economic activity, and the erosion of a state’s
social capital67. Both direct and indirect impacts influence the overall quality of life in a
country, as well as its ability to develop properly.
Society functions best in a productive and healthy environment where people feel
safe enough to steer their focus outward, instead of on protection of personal property and
getting enough food to eat. The climate of terror in Sudan and South Sudan inhibits people
from creating the conditions necessary to foster societal development68. This climate of
fear has facilitated the breakdown of informal norms of trust and cooperation between
people and communities. It inhibits families from feeling a normal sense of social cohesion
and personal mobility. Personal protection becomes the foremost consideration instead of
the importance of political participation or societal improvement69.
Due to the state’s lack of ability to control armed violence with police or military
services, armed violence is hard to contain. The rising toll of civilian deaths makes it more
difficult to determine the distinction between internal war and criminal activity for both
ibid., 6.
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69 ibid., 22.
66
67

27

experts and those involved in the violence. Weak states such as North and South Sudan
have thus experienced rising levels of armed criminality and localized violence. The general
increase in violence does nothing but encourage civilians to seek out more and more
weapons for protection. They purchase arms in self-defense, and with such a culture of
violence, it is difficult not to use them70.
Community violence determines whether people can live in their own homes, earn
a living, have legal protection, or have access to health and education71. The feeling of being
unsafe in one’s own home is a cause of forced displacement. Whole communities in North
and South Sudan have migrated away from their traditional homelands. This changes the
entire nature of communities and tribal relations. It also disrupts normal economic
activities, and can result in even worse situations for the migrants. They are often forced to
flee to areas with less geographic resources, making development even more difficult72.
These inabilities keep people from human security, and thus impact national security and
development as a whole.

CHALLENGES TO DDR
Violence does not stop once armed conflict and war ‘ceases. When SALW are improperly
managed and misused, social services suffer, traditional culture and tribal structure
dissolves, the economy deteriorates, trust between communities disappears, and murder
and violence continues. In a continent like Africa, where borders are porous and only exist
because someone drew them on a map, these issues have a tendency to spill across state

70
71

3.
72

Muggah and Batchelor, “Development,” 22.
United Nations Development Program, “Republic of Sudan DDR Programme: Overview,”
Muggah and Batchelor, “Development,” 27.
28

borders73. This threatens the peace and stability of neighboring countries as well74. It is
clear that something must be done.
When dealing with small arms proliferation, there is a general consensus in the
international community that the best means to solve the problem is through disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. These normally involve measures
introduced after a conflict has ended, aimed at promoting the easy transition of combatants
back to civilian life. It also incorporates aspects of weapons reduction through legislation
and practical approaches to reduce the incentives for possession, rather than actual
destruction of weapons75. However, the same types of DDR programs do not work for every
region. Sudan and South Sudan face a number of unique situations that inhibit these types
of ‘best practice’ programs from working effectively.
The CPA in 2005 set a timeline for the DDR program in Sudan, to be finished by
2011. Unfortunately, the program did very little in terms of weapons reduction or the
successful demobilization of combatants. A very small percentage of the targeted adults
even entered the program. Due to an absence of agreement by stakeholders,
mismanagement and inefficiency, the program failed to achieve any real results. There
exists a growing amount of research that shows that the number of arms collected do not
necessarily lead to better security or boosted civilian confidence. Those weapons that are
collected are often left in storehouses with insufficient security. The failure to truly destroy
collected weapons only contributes to the ‘recycling’ of arms back into civilian hands.76
There has been no real impact on the security in South Sudan, and the size of the SPLA

Formal Interview, David Atwood.
DDR in post conflict, no magic bullet 241
75 Robert Muggah, “No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts,” Round Table
94, no. 379 (2005): 242.
76 Muggah, “No Magic Bullet,” 245.
29
73
74

army has not decreased as was planned77. The reason for this failure is that the DDR ‘best
practices’ do not fit every situation. They aren’t really applicable to the situation in Sudan
and South Sudan, and thus have not succeeded78.
The situation in Sudan and South Sudan involves a number of complicating factors.
Part of the DDR process involves reintegration of soldiers back into communities where
they can find a job and be involved in the economy. However, due to scarce resources and
limited job opportunities, there is very little for the soldiers to return to. The families they
left behind have often been forced to relocate or scattered as a result of conflict, so it is very
hard for the soldiers to even retain links to family members that could help them or include
them. There is also the problem of child soldiers. Many were too young when they joined
that they have not retained an “adult” status in the community; they have no formal
education or basic skills to use in the job market. The communities they return to have
strict cultural and traditional norms, and those that have been away for too long at an early
age will not fit in when they return.
The war tore apart the land and communities, so the towns are often too weak to
support the influx of soldiers returning from war, leading to increased competition, and
fostering resentment and poverty among the village. Economic reintegration is also a
challenge due to the very limited infrastructure of Sudan and South Sudan. The population
returning to towns will find it increasingly hard to survive in areas so desperate for food,
water, and social services. Existing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan also make the
situation very precarious. When South Sudan separated from Sudan, the Sudanese
economy suffered considerably. A loss in oil production of more than 75%, combined with
Jonah Leff, Human Security Baseline Assessment. “Failures and Opportunities:
Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.” Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no. 17, (May 2011):
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international sanctions, foreign debt, and a decrease in foreign investment has led to a
serious economic crisis. These economic issues complicate the DDR efforts from running
smoothly79.
Beyond these economic constraints to reintegration, there is also a huge
psychosocial element that inhibits ex-combatant demobilization in Sudan and South Sudan.
In order for demobilization to work, there need to be adequate psychological services to
make soldiers re-accustomed to civilian life. Men who have been bush-fighting for all of
their lives do not easily transition away from their violent lifestyle. Adequate counseling
and career services need to be in place for demobilization to work properly, or else soldiers
will simply return to their life of violence by joining militant groups or crime gangs80.
In addition, the loyalty and responsibility that is such a large part of the military,
especially the SPLA, makes many soldiers very reluctant to join the DDR process. They do
not understand why they were chosen to demobilize, often feeling rejected81. There is also
the issue of pension and salary; the SPLA now pays a significant portion of the GoSS budget
to its soldiers, removing almost all motivation for combatants to demobilize as part of the
DDR process82.

ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL DDR
These complications require attention. The typical DDR best practices do not work
in this unique scenario. Poorly targeted development and humanitarian assistance often
only serve to fuel conflict; it allows the suffering to prolong, and diverts people from their
79
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normal economic activities. It is easier to divert aid away from the intended beneficiaries in
situations where the region is run by corruption and informal economies83. In the absence
of a coherent political and economic framework, disarmament programs cannot be
successful84. Thus, a new brand of weapons reduction and demobilization must be created.
This must include participatory and locally appropriate responses that acknowledge the
challenges associated with availability and misuse85.
A central part of the effort should not be focused on containing the import of
weapons, but to attack the culture that fuels the demand itself. Programs that aim at
shaping the perceptions of weapons can help decrease the desire for weapons, and
ultimately contribute to the destruction of the culture of violence. Public awareness and
sensitization campaigns make peace education voluntary, which would give more
ownership of the program to its participants86. Currently, there are a number of programs
in neighboring countries that focus on this type of “mental disarmament.” The focus is on
changing the mindset of the population to acknowledge that weapons are not solutions to
the problem, helping to foster a culture of peace. Peace education programs like those
carried out in other developed African countries target schools and military training
centers for hubs of peace education. Peace is a subject in school, and it includes topics of
gender and minority violence to attack the root causes of the violence problem87. This class,
along with the implementation of psychological and social support for ex-combatants,
attacks both the cause and the results of violence and warfare88. Such programs would no
doubt be invaluable in Sudan and South Sudan. Military personnel and young adults are
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often some of the worst instigators of violence, so their education on the importance of
peace is vital.
While the current DDR program has made some small strides in Sudan and South
Sudan, but is extremely costly for relatively little progress. In order to make actual longterm change, the money could instead go to livelihood programs or a pension fund for excombatants. This provides a reasonable alternative to the salary that soldiers earn working
in the military, giving them more of an incentive to demobilize. This would play to the
interests of the SPLA for its members, and hopefully aid in creating lasting solutions. By
making the SPLA as well as SAF and Government of Sudan key players in the weapons
reduction and demobilization effort, it ensures that the program address the actual needs
of the civilians and ex-combatants. It also leaves the possibility of appropriate modification
if needed, and gives more ownership to the people on the ground89.
In order to facilitate these changes, there needs to be an increased level of dialogue
between people on the ground and international actors. Aid organizations need to be able
to get accurate information from community and religious leaders to provide assistance
that is feasible and locally appropriate. These leaders can also provide conflict analysis, and
early warning of rising tensions to help prevent outbreaks of violence. International actors
can also act as mediators between antagonistic groups in Sudan and South Sudan. Trusted
intermediaries can be put in place to facilitate dialogue between these groups and reduce
the potential for conflict. By establishing a working dialogue between these groups, more
progress can be made in the peace process90.
There should also be an effort to harmonize legislation regarding arms use and
transfer between Sudan, South Sudan, and neighboring countries. This means making sure
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that minimum standards in regards to SALW are compatible across the region. This lessens
the ability of groups or individuals to exploit differences in the legal and regulatory systems
regarding SALW control and management. There would be fewer loopholes through which
the illicit arms trade can continue91. In order to ensure that change is actually made, all
parties must agree on the terms and procedure for the process92. To do so, DDR (or an
alternative) must be a central component of peace agreements, not simply an afterthought.
While these are only a few simple ideas to improve the arms reduction
efforts in Sudan and South Sudan, they can act as a jumping-off point for other programs.
Improved communication, providing incentives for voluntary demobilization, peace
education, and harmonization of legislation would all work toward the application of
effective and locally appropriate solutions for the SALW proliferation problem.

CONCLUSION
In a post-war society, SALW proliferation continues a cycle of violence from which it
is very hard to emerge. These weapons are passed to civilian hands through a number of
different vectors. Despite arms trade embargos and sanctions, there continues to be a great
deal of new and recycled weapons introduced to the region. These weapons are distributed
among the civilian population to either serve as protection, or as a means to contribute to
rebellions or intertribal attacks. Sudan and South Sudan provide examples of some of the
many ways in which weapons can be misused and mismanaged. They have complicated the
peace process, especially in Border States like Kordofan and Darfur. They are the source of
worse social, cultural, political and economic conditions all across both countries. Although
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global instruments to exist to deal with arms trade issues, they do not have enough depth
of influence to be useful on the ground. There must be a system in place that works not
only from an international perspective, but also processes that work operate on national,
local, and individual level93. This means integrating these global systems of arms
management with community and state-level mechanisms for tackling arms proliferation.
In order to properly manage this issue, the traditional DDR process must be refined to fit
the Sudan and South Sudan situation. Local and national institutions, such as the GoSS,
SPLA, and Sudanese Government must all be involved in some level of arms management.
By making these institutions more connected with arms reduction efforts, it is more likely
that effective change and legislation can be created. These new efforts must also be in
harmony with the policies of surrounding countries, reducing the possibility for arms
distributers to take advantage of legislative loopholes.
This study provides a snapshot of SALW impacts on Sudan and South Sudan. In
order to gain a fuller understanding of the issue, it may be valuable to examine the trends
in other post-war nations; this type of research would no doubt be invaluable to the
creation of future international legislation regarding the arms trade. If any changes to local
DDR efforts are made in Sudan and South Sudan, it will be necessary to follow up on any
impacts as a result of these changes. How well are Sudan and South Sudan adapting to
legislation and arms reduction program changes? Are these programs targeting the right
people? How can more changes be made in the future to address any shortcomings?94
By answering these types of questions, and analyzing the differences each change in policy
creates, it will be possible to create a DDR and arms reduction policy that works for Sudan
and South Sudan.
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SAS- Small Arms Survey
HSBA-Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan
SPLM/A-Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army
DDR-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
PSSM-physical security and stockpile management
GoSS-government of South Sudan
SAF-Sudan armed forces
SALW-small arms and light weapons
CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)
JEM-Sudan Justice and Equality Movement
SSPS-South Sudan Police Service
SPLA-N-Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North
UN-United Nations
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